

# Overview of Credit Valuation Adjustments

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## Summary

- Banks adjust theoretical value of derivatives due to presence of
  - ◇ residual credit risk,
  - ◇ capital requirements.
- Valuing these adjustments on new business is a corporate finance problem, which in practice is proxied by a derivative pricing problem.
- It affects buy-side firms in various ways...
- ... but also provides a potentially lucrative investment opportunity.

# Outline

XVA and buy-side firms

Economics of XVA

Practice of XVA

Implications of buy-side counterparties

Investment opportunities and structures

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## Why is XVA relevant

- XVA is an umbrella term for several credit and capital-related adjustments to the theoretical price of derivatives.
- Since Basel III, banks must do it and they also have to actively manage market and credit risk on those.
- The adjustments result from the fact that derivatives are bought and sold by real firms (with balance sheet).
- The subject is relevant for the buy side:
  - ◇ Make sense sell-side pricing
  - ◇ Negotiate ISDAs, including Initial Margin (IM)
  - ◇ Understand motivation behind the limit setting process by the banks
  - ◇ Consider investment opportunities in XVA and to relieve banks' capital by mitigating XVA

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## What does “X” stand for

- CVA: credit value adjustment:
  - ◇ haircut for credit riskiness of the counterparty.
- DVA: debit value adjustment:
  - ◇ “CVA” on yourself from the counterparty’s point of view.
- FVA: funding value adjustment:
  - ◇ cost of hedging an uncollateralized derivative with a collateralized one.
- KVA: capital (requirement) value adjustment:
  - ◇ transfer or marginal capital requirement to counterparty.
- MVA: margin value adjustment:
  - ◇ cost of funding margins.

## Creation of XVA

- Consider an unlevered firm with balance sheet equation

$$A_0 = E_0$$

- Changes in asset value generates PNL

$$A_t = E_0 + PNL_t,$$

but default is not possible since there is no liability.

- If the firm trades a derivative then it *creates* marginal asset and/or liability.
- E.g. Interest rate swap is a package referencing *existing* fixed and a floating bond priced at par.

$$A_0 + FloatingBond_0 \leftrightarrow E_0 + FixedBond_0$$

- No equality in the above even if  $FloatingBond_0 = FixedBond_0$ , due to *created* XVA.



## Basic structural model (“Merton”)

- In the above example IRS created marginal credit risk.
- As such, pricing such marginal credit risk is a *corporate finance* problem.
- A structural credit model (“Merton”) uses option pricing analogy to analyze corporate finance problem (“The pricing of options and corporate liabilities”, Black-Scholes, 1973).
- Consider a firm with asset process  $A_t$ ; the firm’s only liability is a zero-bond with notional  $N$  maturing at time  $T$ .
  - ◇ (We start with this trivial case and then generalize to a time “continuum” of bonds with stochastic notionals.)
- What is the value of this bond  $B_t$  and of equity  $E_t$ ?

## DVA

- Assume that rates are zero.
- Time- $T$  payoff to the bond holders is

$$\min(N, A_T) = N - \max(N - A_T, 0) = N - (N - A_T)^+$$

- The second term is a “put” payoff, representing loss in case of default.
- The value of bond is

$$B_t = N - \mathbb{E}^Q(N - A_T)^+ = N - Put(t, A_t, N) = N - DVA$$

- DVA is the bond's haircut due to credit risk.

## Capital, Balance Sheet and PNL

- Payoff to equity holders is “call” on assets, therefore the value is

$$E_t = \mathbb{E}^Q(A_T - N)^+$$

- The balance sheet equation is

$$A_t = E_t + N - DVA_t$$

$$DVA_t + A_t = E_t + N$$

which is call-put parity.

- PNL is still driven by assets, but haircut by change in DVA

$$dDVA_t + dA_t = dE_t,$$

and note that  $\partial DVA_t / \partial A_t < 0$ , as it is a “put”.

## Derivatives as marginal dynamic assets/liabilities

- The above case is generalized to derivatives by making  $N_T$  stochastic (a “contingent” claim).
- The non-stochastic case formulas can be considered conditioned on one terminal value of  $N_T$ .
- Unconditional value can be obtained by taking expectations w.r.t.  $N_T$

$$DVA = \int \mathbb{E}^Q | N_T (A_T - N_T)^+ dP(N_T)$$

- The key take away that every time bank does a derivative trade a new DVA is *created*.
- It is assumed by the investor (counterparty) and *cannot be hedged*; but it can be sold physically or synthetically (via CDS).

## (Original) Wrong Way Risk

- Wrong/Right way risk in mainstream XVA means positive/negative correlation of credit exposure and credit event.
- The structural view such risk is almost always present, since DVA is driven by

$$A_T - N_T,$$

i.e. exposure ( $N_T$ ) explicitly drives default

- This becomes relevant especially for buy-side if  $A_T$  and  $N_T$  are correlated.

## CVA

- CVA is the DVA viewed from the investor's perspective (i.e. the one who buys the bond).
- When derivative is such that it can be both an asset and a liability, then the deal will have both CVA and DVA adjustments.
- In case of 2 counterparties the solution is intuitive.
  - ◇ Assume derivative value process is  $M_t$ .
  - ◇ Then for a given counterparty (1) it is either asset with value  $A_t^{(1)} + M_t^+$  or a liability with value  $-M_t^-$  backed by asset  $A_t^{(1)}$ .
  - ◇  $-M_t^-$  must be haircut by DVA.
  - ◇  $M_t^+$  must be haircut by CVA which is driven by assets  $A_t^{(2)}$  of the other counterparty.

## Multiperiod case

- Multiperiod case is obtained by considering dynamic liabilities with relevant maturities.
- It is important that default can only happen on dates when payments are due!
- This is equivalent to conditioning on default time
- The full DVA is then given by yet another outer integral

$$DVA = \int \int \mathbb{E}^{Q|N_T} (A_T - N_T)^+ dP(N_T) dT$$

## Marginal pricing vs marking to market

- The key idea in pricing derivatives is replication in a complete and arbitrage-free market
  - ◇ All risk are tradeable
  - ◇ Martingale measure exists
  - ◇ No new risks are created
- Therefore “initial pricing” is same as marking to market, as the value of a derivative is same as the value of the replicating portfolio.
- In CVA/DVA, only reference contingent claim exists, while credit risk is created.
- Once it is created, it can be marked to market (theoretically), assuming that it can be sold, at least via a CDS.
- This is the key theoretical difference!
  - ◇ Lot's of research still equates mark to market of CVA with initial pricing.



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## Problems with Merton model

- XVA was originally done not by corporate finance people, but by credit derivative ones.
- They do not like Merton model, as it is hard to make work in practice.
  - ◇ Requires assumption about dynamics of unobserved assets.
  - ◇ Relies on the balance sheet data.
  - ◇ Hard to calibrate to observed credit spreads.
- Machinery of reduced form model was already in place by the time XVA became relevant.

## Reduced form model

- Assume default probability is given endogenously as a “survival probability” function  $S(t)$ :

$$S(t) > 0,$$

$$S(0) = 1,$$

$$S'(t) \leq 0.$$

- Then the time- $t$  present value of a random payoff  $X_u$  on default at time  $u$  will be given by

$$\begin{aligned} V_t &= \mathbb{E} \left( \int_t^T X_u e^{-r(u-t)} [-dS_u] \right) \\ &\approx \sum \mathbb{E} (X_i) e^{-r(u_i-t)} (S(t_i) - S(t_{i-1})). \end{aligned}$$

## CVA as CCDS (1)

- In case of a bond  $X_u = (1 - R)N$ , where  $N$  is bond's notional and  $R$  is recovery rate.
- $V_t$  is then the value of the “protection” leg of a CDS: we are paid notional of bond by the protection seller and give them the defaulted bond, on which they recover  $R$ .
- Assume we have a derivative trade with the counterparty, and the trade's mark to market process from our perspective is  $M_u$ .
- Also assume that  $M_u$  is collateralized and the collateral process is  $C_u$ .
- If  $M_u - C_u > 0$  then we are owed money and we will lose  $(1 - R)(M_u - C_u)^+$  should the counterparty default at time  $u$ .

## CVA as CCDS (2)

- So it seems that if we make  $X_u = (1 - R)M_u^+$ , then

$$\begin{aligned} CVA &= \mathbb{E} \left( \int_t^T (1 - R) (M_u - C_u)^+ e^{-r(u-t)} [-dS_u] \right) \\ &\approx (1 - R) \sum \mathbb{E} (M_{u_i} - C_{u_i})^+ e^{-r(u_i-t)} (S(t_i) - S(t_{i-1})). \end{aligned}$$

is exactly the haircut to the credit-risk free to the value of the derivative.

- It, kind of, is, but it is called “Contingent CDS” (contingent on  $M_u$ ), but it is not exactly CVA.
- CCDS is, effectively, a CDS with time dependent notional, know as “expected exposure profile”  $\mathbb{E} (M_u - C_u)^+$ .
- In reality,  $M_u$  is the netted value of portfolio of derivatives between two counterparties.

## Reduced form model limitations

- Existence of  $S(t)$  requires existence of CDSs on the counterparty, i.e. existence of tradeable bonds on the counterparty.
- The case of unlevered counterparty cannot be handled at all.
- Marginal nature of liability brought by a derivative is ignored; marginal cost is assumed equal to average cost, embedded in  $S(t)$ .
  - ◇ I.e. no difference between pricing XVA on new business and marking to market.
- Default event is most often considered independent from exposure; no Original WWR.
- WWR is sometimes introduced when ignoring it is too unrealistic (e.g. in computing CVA on EM FX trades done with EM banks).

## How and why it mostly works

- Thus, a corporate finance problem is proxied by a derivative pricing problem.
  - ◇ Constructing  $M_u$  is most costly part of calculation and it is more efficient in a “risk-neutral” setting, i.e. using American Monte Carlo.
- But lots of unobserved parameters are proxied in exactly the way it would be done in a corporate finance world.
  - ◇ E.g. cost of debt proxied based on size/geography/industry generics.
- Marginal effects can be ignored if outstanding debt is large, because marginal exposure brought in by derivatives is of the order of 10% of the outstanding debt notional (interest payments).

## Capital requirements

- Up until Basel II.1/5 dealing with credit charges was the matter of prudence, as credit was not part of market risk
- Two schools:
  - ◇ tradeable and hedgeable CVA
  - ◇ CVA as a balance sheet credit charge
- Basel III (post 2008) brought in both components, but not in always consistent way
  - ◇ Counterparty Credit Risk (CRR) Charge
    - ...what you would have on a load
  - ◇ CVA VAR ("Market Risk") Charge
    - ...to motivate actively hedge CVA



## Risk-neutral vs historical measure valuation

- Risk neutral valuation treats CVA as CCDS
- Requires a complex hybrid model calibrated!
  - ◇ Exposure profile on a single IRS is like a strip of off-the-money swaptions.
- Difficult to construct consistently (if possible at all), depends on many unobserved correlations.
  - ◇ ... but allows for fast generation of  $M_u$
- Historical measure model is easier to construct and estimate.
- Slow to generate  $M_u$ , especially on exotics, full revaluation is needed.
- Predictive power is small
  - ◇ ...especially for dependence structure and trends.

## CVA VAR charge

- Treating CVA as a derivative with present value

$$(1 - R) \sum \mathbb{E} (M_{u_i} - C_{u_i})^+ e^{-r(u_i - t)} (S(t_i) - S(t_{i-1}))$$

- Market risk is due to  $M_u$ ,  $C_u$  and  $S(t)$ .
  - ◇ Basel III required that the only source of market risk was  $S(t)$ !
- Initially captured by VAR.
- FRTB replaces VAR with Expected Shortfall, effectively an “average VAR” for the set of levels.
- $M_u$  could be modeled in historical or risk-neutral way.

## Credit limit setting

- As opposed to computing expected exposure  $\mathbb{E}(M_u)^+$ , credit limits are typically set by constructing a “peak” exposure.
  - ◇ For future times construct distributions of  $M_u$ .
  - ◇ Compute a curve of given quantiles of the distribution (e.g. 95%).
  - ◇ Take the maximum.
- For this calculation  $M_u$  need to be in “historical” measure
- No efficient method to compute distributions
- Ability to capture (much) more market risk factors in a consistent way.

## CCR charge

- Initially invented for the portfolio of “loans”
- Derivative portfolio proxied as a “loan” with notional “related” to expected exposure  $\mathbb{E}(M_u - C_u)^+$ .
- This way in can be bundled with other loans to the same counterparties.
- Charge is computed by stressing default probability in a “VAR”-like way.
- $M_u$  is to be modeled in a way consistent with the limit.

## Initial Margin

- Many banks (mostly in US) got approval to compute CVA charge in “risk-neutral” measure.
- This allowed to reuse existing “front office” derivatives infrastructure and not to invest in a system implementing historical measure modeling.
- IM does require such a model
  - ◇ Similar to VAR, but
  - ◇ Possibly longer term
- Naive “historical simulation” will not work for “mean reverting” time series.

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## Back to corporate finance

- Bank systems, typically implementing a reduced-form approach are not always fit to deal with buy side.
  - ◇ Buy side firms may not have CDS tradeable
    - ...so it needs to be proxied as in corporate finance world.
  - ◇ They may be inclined to take larger marginal exposure,
    - ...so marginal effect may not be ignored.
  - ◇ This exposure may come in form of exotic derivatives
    - ...so WWR may become significant.
- As such a form of a structural model may be needed (and probably is used).
- Has the bank ever asked the detailed balance sheet?

## IM and Residual CVA

- Deals are mostly collateralized, so very little residual CVA driven by  $M_u - C_u$
- IM will usually be requested to somewhat mitigate risk over margin period of risk
- It is possible no CVA is going to be computed at all, which will cause underestimation of WWR
  - ◇ ...and it can be large!



## Original Wrong Way Risk

- Consider a non-financial firm

$A_0$	385
DVA	15
Debt	300
Equity	100

- Assume assets are log-normal
- With asset volatility  $\sigma = 0.15$ , this structure yields 5y CDS level of approx 100bp.

## Original Wrong Way Risk

- Assume the firm writes a 5Y ATM put option with max payoff of 10% of its assets
- The risk free value is 5.1 (vs assets of 350 and capital of 100).
- This is a pure liability, so there will be a change in *DVA*
- Mainstream approach would price it off the CDS curve
- Marginal DVA is  $5\% \times 5.1 = 0.25$
- Looks very small, so good deal!

## Original Wrong Way Risk

- To price with a structural model need to make assumption about the proceeds
  - ◇ in cash
  - ◇ in more assets (further doubling up)
- In any case valuation needs to be done numerically, as *DVA* is option on assets less liability which is now an option too

Table : Marginal DVAs

Put value	Simple DVA	Cash	Assets
5.1	0.25	3.2	3.7

- Won't drive firm into default, but will dramatically decrease profitability!

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## Pricing in capital relief...

- ... is key!
- It is not just a derivative we are pricing, but a derivative issued by a firm!
- Examples:
  - ◇ Contingent CDS
  - ◇ Collateral stand-in

## Contingent CDS

- Given a portfolio of derivatives, CCDS pays  $(1 - R)(M_u)^+$  in case of a counterparty's default.
- It is, technically, a CDS with notional being expected exposure profile.
- Needs to be collateralized itself.
- Biggest problem to price is dynamic nature of the underlying portfolio, both composition and duration.
- Capital relief needs to be priced in and is the key driver of value pickup.
- Otherwise it is easier just to sell a straight CDS on the reference entity
  - ◊ Unless it is the case of investing into an liquid or non-existent CDS

## Collateral stand in

- CCDS effectively transfers credit risk on a derivative portfolio as CDS would transfer credit risk in a bond.
- Suppose that an investor would be happy to provide collateral instead of a counterparty that would otherwise not pay collateral.
  - ◊ E.g. a commercial company hedging with a bank.
- In doing so, credit risk is “killed at source”, as collateral explicitly affects exposure profile

$$\mathbb{E}(M_u)^+ \Rightarrow \mathbb{E}(M_u - C_u)^+$$

- This affects both CCR and Market risk charges in *one go!*
- Pricing is essentially of capital relief and portfolio composition is still an issue.